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I. — INTRODUCTION
The growth of adoption of Open Source Software (OSS) in recent years has
attracted the attention of many scholars from different fields. A large number
of case studies has been carried out to explain and empirically ground such a
phenomenon. Among the others, topics such as the organization and ethos of
the community of developers (Giuri et al., 2010), their motivation to provide
code for free (Lerner and Tirole, 2002) and the birth of hybrid business models
(Fosfuri et al., 2008) have been extensively examined by different branches of
literature.
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However, an issue not sufficiently investigated so far is related to how to
model the process of OSS diffusion and its competition with Proprietary
Software (PS). To our knowledge, only few contributions have tried to address
such a crucial topic (e.g. Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003 ; Dalle and Jullien, 2003),
though they rely on quite ad hoc models, rather than on more consolidated
models of diffusion.
Our starting point is thus to model the process of competition between OSS
and PS by means of an epidemic model, accounting for both demand and sup-
ply factors. Moreover, OSS fundamentals depend on a set of factors different
from the PS ones (Lerner and Tirole, 2002), that is, reputational and commu-
nitarian factors (intrinsic and extrinsic motivations) versus profit motivated
factors for PS (2).
We use an epidemic model to depict the process of diffusion of software pac-
kages, which is affected by the size of the installed base (3). Indeed, it is quite
straightforward for this class of models to depict within-technology positive
network effects as a result of contagion (due, for instance, to word-of-mouth
interactions) (4). At the same time, both PS and OSS diffusion are influenced
by the presence of network effects, the level of interoperability, and the pre-
sence of switching costs.
Finally, if compared to standard diffusion models, our model endogenises
the parameter influencing the speed of diffusion across the population of adop-
ters. In so doing, from a theoretical perspective, our model offers a formal
general treatment to solve more complex and more realistic diffusion models :
it offers a way to properly deal with diffusion patterns whose speed can vary,
as the process unfolds, since the interactions among the technologies contri-
bute to change the incentives for consumers, as they progressively discover
their characteristics.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the theoretical
background : in particular, about the competition between PS and OSS, and
(2) Nonetheless, a considerable number of large firms decided to enter into the software mar-
ket in order to benefit from this process. Among the others, IBM, Novell and Dell are
worth mentioning. This fact has led to the creation of a new type of hybrid business model
characterised by the presence of for-profit companies benefiting from OSS solutions,
mainly developed by the not-for-profit OSS communities they support (West, 2003 ;
Fosfuri et al., 2008). Furthermore, an increasing number of countries all over the world
has started discussing about the role OSS should have in public administration.
(3) An increasing number of studies provides empirical evidence on the importance of net-
work effects, both direct and indirect, in different market segments of the software indus-
try. See, for instance, Gandal (1994) and Brynjolfsson et al. (1996) for spreadsheets ;
Chiaravutthi (2006) for browsers ; and Gandal (1995) for PC software.
(4) As it will be clear in what follows, for the across-technology network effects we will intro-
duce interoperability issues between the two technologies.
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about the models of diffusion (Section 2). We then discuss the general frame-
work within which the two technologies compete. Specifically, a set of three
main features are considered : network effects, interoperability and switching
costs. These characteristics are incorporated in the formal model developed in
Section 3. The results are then presented in the following sections, where seve-
ral variants of the model are discussed : (i) a base version characterised by
constant propagation coefficients for the two technologies (Section 4) ; (ii) an
extended version with changing propagation coefficients without network
effects (Section 5.1) and then with network effects (Section 5.2). Section 6
concludes.
II. — THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Open source software has gained momentum thanks to several relevant
« success stories », such as the Internet browser Firefox, the Web server
Apache, the suite OpenOffice/Libre Office and the mail sending protocol
Fetchmail, that can be explained by several stylised facts (Leoncini, 2004). As
a matter of fact, recent years have witnessed an increasing competition bet-
ween proprietary and open source products. In particular, market shares of
dominant proprietary vendors have experienced increasing pressure from OSS.
Although contributions on this topic are flourishing (see Rossi (2006) and
Wheeler (2005) for thorough surveys), the literature dealing with the processes
of competition and diffusion of two competing technologies (i.e. OSS vs PS)
has attracted less effort, mainly because of the difficulty to properly model it.
The contributions on this topic can be grouped into two main subsets. First,
the majority of works are based on static models of industrial organization. In
particular, several contributions stressed the importance of consumers in OSS
production (Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003 ; Kuan, 2001), and model the com-
petition between the two modes of production assuming that agents must deci-
de between buying software and producing it, while other models (Johnson,
2002) refer to the decision of individual user-programmers to contribute to
software program as a decision to produce a public good, resulting in partici-
pation only if the benefit-cost ratio is higher than a certain threshold and such
threshold increases with the probability of free-riding. Schmidt and Schnitzer
(2003) show that increasing the number of OSS users by means of public sub-
sidies can lead to an increase of software price of proprietary software users
who find themselves in a lock-in situation. In the same vein, Bitzer (2004)
finds that product heterogeneity is the main factor explaining the ability of
incumbent firm (producing PS) to be profitable by setting a higher price stra-
tegy than the new entrant producing OSS. Bessen (2006) shows that OSS pro-
duction is more efficient because it satisfies more complex and sophisticated
consumers’ needs.
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The second strand of literature adopts dynamic frameworks, by referring
mainly to the role of increasing returns on the demand side. Such works intro-
duced (both direct and indirect) network effects, which are likely to induce
path-dependent processes (Arthur, 1989) and to produce lock-in effects
(David, 1985). In particular, Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2003) introduce an expli-
cit OSS adoption function and show that, under some plausible assumptions,
the two software production modes are likely to coexist. Dalle and Jullien
(2003) introduce a more complex OSS adoption function by incorporating
both local and global network effects (5). They find that the pace of code
improvement and proselytism are important factors in explaining both OSS
success and its coexistence with PS. In spite of their importance, these contri-
butions still lack a formal analytical treatment that do not allow for general
results.
Although developed within different frameworks (static models of industrial
organization vs. non-linear dynamic models), all the models belonging to the
two principal subsets reach a similar conclusion : PS and OSS are likely to
coexist in the long-run. However, none of these works has properly analysed
the dynamics of the diffusion of the two competing software, which are based
on different industrial organization models (6).
The literature on the diffusion of innovation is vast and covers different
strands, from orthodox to heterodox ones (7).
In this paper, we therefore adopt an epidemic model of diffusion as it
explains the diffusion dynamics in terms of a disequilibrium process during
which knowledge comes to be differentially distributed among agents. In par-
ticular, we will follow the strand pioneered by Metcalfe (1981) and Batten
(1987), who introduced a supply side in the demand-led model by Mansfield
(1961). In this way, the dynamic path follows a logistic pattern determined by
(5) The former refers to the proportion of a user’s neighbours having already adopted OSS,
the latter to the proportion of adopters in the whole population.
(6) A notable exception is the recent contribution of Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat
(2006), who introduce a dynamic mixed duopoly model allowing competitors to have
heterogeneous objective functions and model the presence of demand-side learning.
Unlike the standard industrial organization models, in this paper the dynamics of compe-
tition between the two software are properly taken into account. However, differently from
the approach of this paper, the dynamics of competition between the two softwares assu-
me linear demand functions. Moreover, their results are heavily contingent on the asym-
metric behaviors of the two producers. Specifically, the firm supplying proprietary soft-
ware is the only one allowed to not behave in a myopic way, thus ruling out the possibili-
ty for modeling competition between a « pure » proprietary model and a « hybrid » model.
(7) For a comprehensive survey on models of technology diffusion reporting a set of different
models’ typologies see, for instance, Karshenas and Stoneman (1995) and Geroski (2000).
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the joint dynamics of market demand and growth in production capacity.
Further developments proposed more than one technique in order to show how
the process of diffusion might be the result of competition among techniques,
rather than the smooth diffusion of one only (Amable, 1992 ; Leoncini, 2001).
At the core of the epidemic approach there is the idea that the relevant fea-
tures of a technology are not well known and, as the available information
spreads, the level of uncertainty associated with it decreases, thus increasing
the number of adopters. Expectations play a big role, as they come to depend
on the information available from previous adopters, but also on the externali-
ties gathered from the network of other users.
These characteristics are at the basis of our choice, since software adoption
follows a path of progressive discovery of its main features, which is highly
dependent on other adopters’ information sets. As network externalities are
heavily based on information exchange, this kind of models are appropriate,
although some modifications are needed. Indeed, the analysis must take into
account the peculiarities in software production and the process of competition
involved. In particular, two major improvements are needed : (i) the presence
of network effects on the demand side (a well known phenomenon discussed
in the literature on network industries such as software, hardware, aircraft, etc.,
(Shy, 2001)) ; (ii) the possibility of joint adoption of competing products,
which applies mainly to software industries characterised by increasing levels
of standardization (Economides, 1996).
3. GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL
In this Section we present the general structure of the model. Before doing
this, some important stylised facts dealing with the task of modelling two com-
peting software technologies using epidemic diffusion models must be addres-
sed. In particular, five elements are worth discussing.
First of all, most of the time either a new operating system or a new appli-
cation is likely to be adopted by a non-user if she is informed by a current user.
Hence, the diffusion of knowledge about a technology can be thought as a
disease that spreads all over a population of non-users who, once infected, add
up to the population of current users. This factor points to the adoption of epi-
demic models to model the process of interest as straightforward (8).
(8) It must be underlined that we will not takes into account the possibility of differential mor-
bidity among the population of adopters. Indeed, it could be possible to consider that OSS
users behave differently from OSS developers. However, as the number of OSS adopters
increases, the share of « simple » users increases so that we can assume that OSS and PS
users tend to converge as the diffusion process unfolds.
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Furthermore, epidemic models are better suited than game theory models to
describe situations in which, on the one side, there are important problems
related to the effects of the transmission of knowledge among agents about the
unknown characteristics of a technology, and, on the other side, the interest in
strategic behaviour is almost non-existent, since OSS developers cannot « by
definition » take into account how the evolution of their software will impact
upon the competing one. Hence, it is easier to deal with the strategic behaviour
of only one side (PS) considering that some of its possible choices are unrela-
ted to the competitor’s reaction.
Second, as already pointed out, epidemic models take into account the sup-
ply side by incorporating the production capacity growth rate (Metcalfe,
1981). This is a reasonable step to be taken if standard technologies are to be
modelled. Nonetheless, our analysis concentrates on the software industry and
here the relationship between demand and production capacity is not as strict
as in other cases : in particular, software producers can instantaneously supply
a new unit of output at negligible costs. This fact rules out the need to equate
the rate of growth of demand and supply and their level at each point in time.
Of course, accounting for the supply of software is important and we do it by
relating it directly to the speed of technology diffusion, namely the propaga-
tion coefficient. Indeed, we assume that the two different modes of production
characterising the two competing softwares impact directly on the probability
that a user has to « infect » current non-users.
Third, several contributions have stressed the importance of, both positive
and negative, network effects on the demand side as far as the software indus-
try is concerned (Katz and Shapiro, 1985 ; Liebowitz and Margolis, 1994 ; Shy,
2001). Positive network externalities in the standard sense arise whenever
« the utility that a user derives from consumption of a good increases with the
number of other agents consuming the good » (Katz and Shapiro, 1985,
p. 424). Although the standard models of epidemic diffusion are not micro-
founded in terms of utility functions, we believe that the essence of the model
is able to capture the effect of positive network externalities. Indeed, the logis-
tic diffusion process for each technology implies that the probability for non-
users to adopt the new technology is an increasing function of the population
of those who have already adopted. Moreover, this effect, is not only based on
a price mechanism, but it results in a true externality process (i.e. a word-of-
mouth process).
We also take into account the negative network externalities likely arise from
the need of interaction across users of different, and not perfectly inter-ope-
rable standards, when these different standards coexist in the market. Indeed,
the fact that users of one software are forced to interact with users of other
incompatible software reduces the utility they can get from it.
We model this feature by means of a parameter, h (≥ 1), which captures the
level of interoperability between the two software technologies. Moreover,
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because of the possible existence of asymmetries in this interoperability
(Economides, 1996), we allow h to be different across technologies (9). In par-
ticular, we denote with hop the degree of interoperability of OSS (henceforth
indicated by the O subscript) with PS (henceforth indicated by the P sub-
script), as it results from (i) the willingness of OSS developers to produce soft-
ware inter-operable with PS, and (ii) the degree of closure of PS standards.
This is because, in case of closed standards, it might still be possible for OSS
developers to implement the standard by reverse engineering, but this requires
more efforts and usually does not produce perfect results. Likewise, hpo
denotes the interoperability level of PS with OSS, as it results mainly from the
decisions of PS producers.
Fourth, switching costs are another feature peculiar of software industry. In
general, switching costs arise when a buyer finds it costly to switch from one
supplier to another because of habits produced by past purchasing decisions.
In a market with switching costs a firm’s current market share is therefore an
important determinant of its future market success (Klemperer, 1995). We
account for the possible existence of switching costs by means of a parameter,
q, positively related with the extent of such costs. q measures the probability
that an agent already using a technology does not adopt the other. Also in this
case, we allow for possible differences in the extent of such costs : we thus
denote with qop the probability that a OSS user does not adopt a PS, and with
qpo the probability that a PS user does not start using OS. Clearly, the larger
the differences in the way the two technologies interact with the final user (lan-
guages, GUI, options, etc.), the greater the costs associated with the adoption
of one technology for a previous user of the other. Moreover, the extent of this
switching costs, and thus the value of q, may also be negatively related with
the degree of interoperability (h). Indeed, the lack of interoperability is a form
of switching cost : since, when using the other software, one loses all the files
and applications written in the old one. Hence, qop should be properly inten-
ded as a function of hop : qop = qop (hop, go), where ∂qop /∂hop < 0. And the same
should hold for qpo, i.e. qpo = qpo (hpo, gp), with ∂qpo /∂hpo < 0 (10).
With this caveat in mind, q enters into the model in two different ways : (i)
the lower q, the higher the potential demand for a technology (since the pro-
bability that previous users of the other technology adopts it is greater) ; (ii) the
lower q, the lower the negative across-technologies network effects given a
certain degree of interoperability. Indeed, if the probability of users to move
across technologies is quite high, one expects that some of the agents with
(9) For instance, OpenOffice can read and save files in Microsoft Office formats, whereas the
latter does not recognise OpenDocument formats. In a similar manner, the great majority
of Linux distributions can read and write file systems in the Microsoft’s proprietary for-
mats, while the opposite does not hold, unless by using third party packages.
(10) We are indebted to one of the referees for this point.
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whom she interacts will soon move to her technology and will prefer to stay
with the technology currently used rather than dismissing it (11).
We assume that the maximum number of potential users of one or both the
technologies (D) is exogenously given (12). Each software technology diffuses
following a logistic pattern.In particular, in line with the epidemic approach,
we assume that every current adopter of PS (Ap) in each instant in time has a
given probability (bp) to induce the adoption of each non adopter (D – Ap – Ao)
plus each OSS user who is willing to adopt PS (given by (1 – qop) Ao), which
is negatively affected by the extent of switching costs. Moreover, the greater
the fraction of OSS users not willing to adopt PS (qopAo), the greater the pro-
bability that each PS user will actually dismiss PS given the need for the PS
users to interact with them when the degree of interoperability between PS and
OSS (hpo) is actually small.
The diffusion dynamics of the number of PS adopters (Ap) can thus be repre-
sented by the following non-linear differential equation :
qop
A˙p = bp Ap (D – Ap – qopAo) – —— AoAp
hpo
In a symmetric way, the diffusion dynamics of OSS adopters (Ao) are given by :
qpo
A˙o = bo Ao (D – Ao – qpoAp) – —— ApAo
hop
Despite the symmetry, the two technologies are characterised by two diffe-
rent production processes and system of incentives. PS is the product of stan-
dard profit-maximising firms, with high fixed costs and negligible marginal
costs. On the contrary, OSS is produced thanks to the co-ordination of a com-
munity providing the source code for free. Hence, the most important factor
influencing PS rate of diffusion is the price of the software while, for OSS, it
is the effort lavished by the community of developers. This difference will be
shown to entail different behaviours in the pattern of diffusion driven by diffe-
rences in software qualities and characteristics.
(11) It is also worth stressing that taking the levels of interoperability and switching costs as exo-
genous, as we do in what follows, does not exclude possible extensions where h and q result
from endogenous and possibly strategic decisions of software producers. In this case, the com-
parative statics provided by the model can be still useful to look at the possible effects of the
strategic choices. In this respect, an assumption of strategic behaviour seems more reasonable
on the PS side than the OSS one, given the mostly decentralised structure behind the latter.
(12) Users do not have to be necessarily identical. Indeed, one might conceive our model as a
sort of « mean-field » approximation when the agents are heterogeneous but fully-mixed,
so that they are distributed randomly in the population and their interactions do not exhi-
bit strong clustering. Actually, when agents are highly heterogeneous in terms of prefe-
rences and capabilities and they interact through a fixed social network, the aggregate
dynamics can be substantially more complex and may depend on the topology of the net-
work (see, for instance, Vega-Redondo, 2007).
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As for OSS, it is always provided at no cost and for this reason its quality is
initially low. Hence, the probability that potential users adopt OSS in following
time steps is rather low. Nevertheless, OSS quality can improve, even at a high
pace, if its user base increases. Indeed, some non adopters will be induced to
choose OSS just because it is a free alternative to costly PS. On the other side,
PS is characterised by a more constant quality in the sense that it comes to the
market with a rather good quality level because the software house provides an
already mature and tested product. However, in order to recoup the high deve-
lopment costs, PS is initially characterised by a high selling price which hin-
ders its pace of diffusion. When PS user base increases, the software house is
able to spread fixed costs over a larger customer base, thus lowering the price.
And this, in turn, increases further its speed of diffusion.
The effectiveness of the word-of-mouth – the propagation coefficient b in the
two differential equations – is thus crucial and can actually be different for the
competing technologies, since it turns out to be a function of the characteris-
tics of the technology itself, which change in the diffusion.
In particular, as for PS, we assume that bp is a strictly decreasing and conca-
ve function of its price : bp = ¶p (c) where c is the price of PS, with ¶¢p (c) < 0
and ¶″p (c) ≤ 0. Moreover, given that software industry is characterised by eco-
nomies of scale (Shy, 2001), we assume that the price of PS is a decreasing and
convex function of its installed base : c = c(Ap) with c¢(Ap) < 0 and c″(Ap) > 0.
It follows that the speed of diffusion of PS turns out to be a strictly increasing
and concave function of the number of PS users :
bp = bp (Ap) = ¶p (c(Ap))
d¶p (c)
b¢p (Ap) = ——— = ¶¢p (c) c¢ (Ap) > 0 (1)
dAp
d2¶p (c)
b″p (Ap) = ———— = ¶″p (c) (c¢ (Ap))2 + ¶¢p (c) c″ (Ap) < 0 (2)
dA2p
As for OSS, given that its development does not entail any explicit moneta-
ry cost, but it is simply the result of the efforts made by the community respon-
ding both to intrinsic and extrinsic motivations (Lerner and Tirole, 2002 ;
Bitzer et al., 2007), its final users do not face any direct explicit adoption cost,
but only implicit ones (13).
The OSS community should be conceived as an heterogeneous group of
people willing to participate in the improvement of the software. This com-
munity is composed of different participants characterised by different levels
(13) It must be noted that some authors (e.g. Wheeler, 2005 ; Fitzgerald, 2006) acknowledge
that the total cost of ownership, as implicit cost, may be as high as the explicit costs of
buying a PS, although there is not unanimity on this point.
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of commitment to a particular project. We acknowledge the fact that develo-
pers have a large role to play in the process of creation of OSS code, we never-
theless believe that other typologies of participants (e.g. those occasionally
supplying patches, reporting bugs, asking for assistance, etc.) have an impor-
tant part in the process of ameliorating the final product (see Giuri et al. (2010)
for empirical evidence on this point) (14). For this reason, the effort of the
community should be conceived as the sum of the individual efforts exerted by
all of the typologies of participants to a particular OSS project. Relying on the
fact that, the higher the effort of the community, the more the OSS is « deve-
loped » and therefore the less the costs borne by final users, we assume a nega-
tive relation between the total amount of such efforts and the level of these
costs. The probability of OSS adoption (bo) is thus modelled as a strictly
increasing function of community’s efforts (e) with non increasing marginal
returns of efforts. In formal terms, bo = ¶o (e), with ¶¢o (e) > 0 and ¶″o (e) ≤ 0.
Given that the sets of OSS final users and developers are likely to overlap
due to the importance in the OSS method of production of user-driven innova-
tion (see Section 2 and von Hippel and von Krogh (2003)), we assume that the
level of efforts is positively related to the number of OSS adopters (e¢(Ao) > 0).
Moreover, given that larger communities of developers are more likely to face
coordination problems (such as, for instance, either disagreement on the actual
piece of code to be incorporated into the final release, or disputes over credit
attribution, with a higher probability of « forking » (Lerner and Tirole, 2002)),
we assume further that the increase of efforts in development is less propor-
tional than the increase of the level of adoption (e″(Ao) < 0) (15).
Hence, the speed of diffusion of OSS can be represented as a strictly increa-
sing and concave function of the number of OSS users :
bo = bo (Ao) = ¶o (e (Ao))
d¶o (e)
b¢o (Ao) = ———— = ¶¢o (e) e¢(Ao) > 0 (3)
dAo
d2¶o (c)
b″o (Ao) = ———— = ¶″o (e) (e¢(Ao))2 + ¶¢o (e) e″(Ao) < 0 (4)
dA2o
(14) The individual effort can be conceived as the opportunity cost of choosing to participate
to the community. This cost is evidently higher for core developers compared to less tech-
nical contributors, but core developers are less numerous compared to other kinds of par-
ticipants. So, we expect the aggregate level of effort to represent a more balanced mixtu-
re of developers and final users. Based on that, the effort level is expected to increase with
the OSS user base.
(15) Strong evidence supporting this assumption has been recently provided by an empirical
work employing data on the population of OSS projects hosted on SourceForge.net
(Comino et al., 2007).
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Overall, although the production of PS and OSS is driven by different types
of actors, firms and community of developers respectively, which respond to
different types of incentives, c and e respectively, and, thus, are eminently dif-
ferent in their intimate essence, the effects we derive on the relationship bet-
ween speed of diffusion and level of adoption turn out to be similar for both
software. It is worth noting that our model is able to report differences in beha-
viour without an explicit functional forms of the different propagation coeffi-
cients (bp and bo). This is an advantage, as by making reasonable assumptions
on the first and second derivatives only, we provide a tractable model of such
a complex process of diffusion.
The dynamics of diffusion can be thus represented by the following autono-
mous non-linear system of differential equations :
qop
A˙p = bp (Ap) Ap (D – Ap – qopAo) – —— AoAp
hpo
qpo
A˙o = bo (Ao) Ao (D – Ap – qpoAp) – —— ApAo (5)
hop
The system reduces to a standard Lotka-Volterra model for two competing
species (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998) when b is constant and h Æ ∞ for both
technologies. We innovate this baseline model in three respects : (i) we model
the supply of software, being it PS or OSS, by endogenising the propagation
coefficient ; (ii) we introduce negative network effects on the demand side
(positive ones are already considered in the logistic diffusion process) ; (iii) we
account for the effect of switching costs on both the share of would-be adop-
ters and the extent of network effects.
IV. — DIFFUSION PATTERNS WITH CONSTANT
PROPAGATION COEFFICIENT
In this Section, we discuss the results of the model by assuming that the
actual level of technology diffusion does not significantly affect the relevant
features of the technology (i.e. the price for PS and the level of development
for OSS (c¢(Ap) = e¢(Ao) = 0)) ; or, equivalently, that such features do not alter
the probability of adoption (¶¢p (c) = ¶¢o (e) = 0). Thus, we have that bp and bo are
constant, and system (5) can be written :
1
A˙p = bpAp (D – Ap – (1 + ———) qopAo)hpobp
1
A˙o = boAo (D – (1 + ———) qpoAp – Ao) (6)hopbo
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Therefore, with a constant propagation coefficient, equations (6) replicate
the well-known Lotka-Volterra equations for two competing species (see, for
instance, Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998, Ch.3). The isoclines are straight lines
with negative slopes :
D 1
Ao = —————— – —————— Ap (7)
1 1
(1 + ——) qop (1 + ——) qophpobp hpobp
1
Ao = D – (1 + ———) qop Ap (8)
hopbo
Given the constraints on the parameters, these lines intersect at most once
provided that either hpobp ≠ qop /(1 – qop) or hopbo ≠ qpo /(1 – qpo). Figure 1
depicts the possible cases with the out of equilibrium directions.
The sufficient and necessary condition for the stable coexistence of the tech-
nologies in the market is therefore that the following inequalities hold (16) :
qop qpo
hpobp > ———                   hopbp > ——— (9)
1 – qop 1 – qpo
i.e. the speed of adoption corrected for the interoperability degree must be
greater than the odds against the adoption of the technology by the current
users of the other technology (figure 1(a)).
If condition (9) holds for only one technology, this technology displaces
completely the other (figures 1(c) and 1(d)). When instead condition (9) does
not hold for any technology, we are in the so called bistable case (figure 1(b)).
There are two basins of attraction : the orbits in the first one converge to (D,
0), whereas the others to (0, D), while E is a saddle point. In such a case, ini-
tial conditions matter.
Let us note that, in case of stable coexistence, a decrease of the switching
costs to one technology for previous users of the other technology decreases
the total number of users of that technology, both exclusive users and co-users ;
whereas an increase of the interoperability of one technology actually makes
these users increase. In formal terms, if condition (9) is satisfied and there are
(16) Let us note that this equilibrium is globally stable (or uniformly asymptotically stable in
the large). Thus, the initial conditions do not actually matter. For a proof of the global sta-
bility of the equilibrium in the case of stable coexistence for the Lotka-Volterra equations
for two competing species by means of the Lyapunov function see, for instance, Medio
and Lines (2001).
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some switching costs (q > 0) for both technologies, we have the following set
of partial derivatives :
∂A*p ∂A
*
o ∂A
*
o ∂A
*
p
—— < 0  —— > 0  —— < 0  —— > 0
∂qop ∂qop ∂qpo ∂qpo
∂A*p ∂A
*
o ∂A
*
o ∂A
*
p
—— > 0  —— < 0  —— > 0  —— < 0
∂bp ∂bp ∂bo ∂bo
∂A*p ∂A
*
o ∂A
*
o ∂A
*
p
—— > 0  —— < 0  —— > 0  —— < 0.
∂hpo ∂hpo ∂hop ∂hop
FIGURE 1 : Dynamics with constant propagation coefficient
(a) Asymptotically stable equilibrium with
technologies’ coexistence (high interoperabi-
lity/low switching costs for both)
(b) Saddle point (low interoperability/high
switching costs for both)
(c) Market tips in favor of OSS (low inter-
operability of PS with OSS/high cost of swit-
ching from OS to PS)
(d) Market tips in favour of PS (low inter-
operability of OSS with PS/high cost of swit-
ching from PS to OSS)
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So, for instance, when the costs of switching from PS to OSS (qpo)
decreases, there is an absolute increase of OSS users (from A*o to A¢o in figu-
re 2(a)) and a decrease of PS users (from A*p to A¢p in figure 2(a)).
On the contrary, if the degree of interoperability of OSS technology
decreases because of the closure of the standards adopted by PS, this makes
total OSS users decrease, whereas PS users instead increases (figure 2(b)).
Thus, the closure of the standard by the PS producer is a very effective strate-
gy in order to tip the market, causing a more than proportional decrease in OSS
market share (17).
When hb >> 1, the number of users who will jointly use the two technologies
1
in equilibrium in case of stable coexistence will be (1 – (1 + ——) qop) A*ohpobo1
(= (1 – (1 + ——) qpo) A*p). hopbp
Let us finally note that the market shares in case of stable coexistence are not
affected by the absolute size of the market (18).
FIGURE 2: Comparative statics
(a) Decrease in the costs of switching from
PS to OSS (qpo decreases)
(b) Closure of PS standards (hop decreases)
(17) However, it is worth noting that, by taking into account the possible impact that the degree
of interoperability has on the costs of switching, the final result can be less sharp. Indeed,
when the decrease of hop produces an increase in qop, in addition to the clockwise rotation
of the isocline of Ao showed in the figure 2(b), the isocline of Ap rotates counterclockwi-
se around the point D on the abscissa. This will tend to reduce the number of co-users and
thus reduce both the number of total users of Ao and Ap. The final effect will depend on
the relative strength of these two effects.
(18) The ratio between the total number of OS and PS users is indeed given by
A
*
o hpobp qpo – hopbo (1 – qpo)
—— = ——— . —————————
A
*
p hopbo qop – hpobp (1 – qop)
and it does not depend on the total amount of demand (D).
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V. — DIFFUSION PATTERNS WITH CHANGING PROPAGATION
COEFFICIENT
In this Section we modify the previous model by assuming that the two dif-
ferent supply structures influence the propagation coefficient and, through it,
the patterns of diffusion. In particular, Section 5.1. assumes perfect interope-
rability between the two technologies, whereas Section 5.2. takes into account
the most complex case of the diffusion of two competing software technolo-
gies with non-perfect interoperability and switching costs.
5.1. Perfect interoperability
In the limiting case of perfect interoperability (i.e. hpo Æ ∞ and hop Æ ∞),
the system of differential equations (5) becomes :
A˙p = bp (Ap) Ap (D – Ap – qopAo)
A˙o = bo (Ao) Ao (D – Ao – qpoAp) (10)
Although b is now a function of the actual level of diffusion of the relative
technology, the equilibrium values depend only on the extent of switching
costs (q) and are equal to :
1 – qop
A
*
p = ———— D
1 – qopqpo
1 – qpo
A
*
o = ———— D (11)
1 – qopqpo
Provided that these parameters are not degenerate, such equilibrium is
asymptotically stable, no matter what the actual forms of the functions b are
(see Appendix A.1. for a proof of the asymptotic stability of the equilibrium).
In such case, the situation is still the one depicted in figure 1(a), although now
there is perfect interoperability. Thus, in the present case the outcome is
always the stable coexistence.
It is worth stressing that the market shares of the competing technologies are
not affected by those features that interact with the propagation coefficient (i.e.
the price for PS and level of development for OSS), but only by the ones which
instead affect the switching costs. Thus, by assuming perfect interoperability
and the presence of switching costs, the final outcome is neither the most effi-
cient one nor the one in which the product with the best features (effective or
potential) is actually chosen (Arthur, 1989). In the stable equilibrium all the
users adopt at least one technology, whereas the number of users who jointly
adopt the two is equal to (1 – qop) A
*
o (= (1 – qpo) A
*
p).
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5.2. Non-perfect interoperability
In order to analyse the dynamics in the most complex case, we work out the
isoclines :
1       hpobp (Ap)
A*o (Ap) = —— —————— (D – Ap) (12)
qop 1 + hpobp (Ap)
1       hopbo (Ao)
A*p (Ao) = —— —————— (D – Ao) (13)
qop 1 + hopbo (Ao)
Let us note first that the convex hull of {(0, 0), (D, 0), (D, D), (0, D)} is the
only relevant area, given that the threshold D is a physical constraint (i.e. the
actual number of users of each technology cannot be greater than the maxi-
mum feasible number of users). Hence, we have to take into account only the
interval [0, D] for each variable.
To start with, we analyse the isocline of Ap in such interval. For equation
(12), we have :
dA*o hpobp (Ap)      b¢p (Ap)
—— = ————————— (——— (D – Ap) – (1 + hpobp (Ap))) (14)dAp qop (1 + hpobp (Ap))2 bp (Ap)
d2A*o 2hpo (D – Ap)              hpob¢p (x)
2 b¢p (x)  b″p (x)
—— = – ————————— (—————— + ——— – ———) (15)dA2p qop (1 + hpobp (Ap))2 1 + hpobp (x)      D – x 2
If conditions (1) and (2) hold and qop is not degenerate, we have d
2
A
*
o /dA
2
p
< 0 for Ap Œ [0, D]. Hence, equation (12) is strictly concave in such interval.
Moreover, given that :
dA*o 1          hpobp (D)
—— | = – —— ——————— (< 0)dAp Ap = D qop 1 + hpobp (D)
and limAp Æ D A
*
o (Ap) = 0, by the strict concavity of A
*
o (Ap) follows that :
1        hpobp (D)
A
*
o (Ap) = A
*
o (D + (Ap – D)) < —— —————— (D – Ap)
qop 1 + hpobp (D)
for each Ap Œ [0, D). Thus, the function A
*
o (Ap) lies below the straight line :
hpob
M
p D hpob
M,
p 
Ao = ——————— – ——————— Ap (16)
(1 + hpob
M
p ) qop (1 + hpob
M
p ) qop
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where bMp = bp (D). This line is the isocline of Ap in the model with a constant
propagation coefficient, calculated at the maximum attainable PS propagation
coefficient (equation (7)). 
Moreover, by assuming limAp Æ 0 bp (Ap) = 0, we have :
dA*o hpob¢p (0)
lim    —— = ———— D > 0
Ap Æ 0 dAp qop
and there is therefore a unique local maximum of the function (A*oM Œ [0,
D—
qop]) lying in the domain (0, D) (19). Hence, the function is as in figure 3(a)
and Ap will increase (decrease) depending on the combination (Ap, Ao) being
actually below (above) the function.
What remains to be analysed are the effects of the two parameters (qop and
hpo) on the shape of the function. As for qop, it is sufficient to note that it enters
the function simply as a multiplicative constant. Hence, an increase of qop
(19) When hpo Æ ∞ we have :
bp (Ap) D b¢p (Ap) D D
lim    A
*
o (Ap) =    lim    ————— =    lim    ————— = —— .
Ap Æ 0 Ap Æ 0 qopbp (Ap)       Ap Æ 0 qopb¢p (Ap)   qop
dA
*
o bp (Ap)
2
b¢p (Ap) (b¢p (Ap) + b″p (Ap)) 1
lim    —— =    lim    – ————— =    lim    – ———————————— = – ——
Ap Æ 0 dAp Ap Æ 0 qopbp (Ap)
2
Ap Æ 0 qopb¢p (Ap) (b¢p (Ap) + b″p (Ap)) qop
and we are back in the case analysed in Section 5.1.
FIGURE 3 : Isoclines
(a) Isocline of Ap (b) Isocline of Ao
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moves Ap isocline downward as in figure 4(a). As for hpo, an increase of it
makes the curve to change as in figure 4(b) (see Appendix B for a more in
depth analysis of the effects of the parameters on A*o (x)).
In the light of the analogy of assumptions (1)-(2) and (3)-(4), equations (12)
and (13) are symmetric with respect to the axes and the isocline of Ao is the
one shown in figure 3(b). All the analysis carried out for the isocline of Ap is
therefore valid also for the other isocline provided that the notation for Ap is
substituted with the notation for Ao.
The solutions for the most complex case are depicted in figure 5. We can
have one stable solution with coexistence of both technologies (point E in figu-
re 5(a)) (20), which is not a globally stable equilibrium, as points outside the
hearth-shaped area tend towards equilibria characterised by winner-take-all
solutions (points D). The stability of the equilibrium point depends on the
shape of the isoclines. Indeed, if the value of q is big enough and/or that of h
is small enough (as in figure 4), meaning that the two technologies are beco-
ming more and more « separate » in terms of both complementary and substi-
tute uses, then the area of stable trajectories shrinks, and the equilibrium
point E becomes a saddle point (figure 5(b)), which shows one winning tech-
nology and dependence from initial conditions.
These last features of the model, allow to make some interesting comparati-
ve dynamics exercises (figure 6, see next page), to introduce, although in a
FIGURE 4: Changes of the parameters
(a) Increase of qop (b) Increase of hpo
(20) See Appendix A.2. for a proof of the stability of the equilibrium.
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very crude way, some strategic interactions. First, a closure of the PS standard
is likely to induce a strong negative effect on OSS that can even tip the market
in favor of PS (figure 6(a)). This implies that PS producers have an important
strategic instrument to reduce the degree of interoperability of OSS and lock-
in the market towards proprietary technology (21). Second, a decrease in the
level of switching costs for PS users produces an increase in the overall num-
ber of users adopting OSS (figure 6(b)). This increase can be a consequence of
the commitment of OSS towards user-friendly applications and the develop-
ment of graphical interfaces similar to existing PS ones.
It should also be noted that, as far as OSS is concerned, the community ethos
(i.e. the strong sense of belonging to the community of developers) can decrea-
se considerably the probability of OSS users to adopt PS. This can be regarded
as a sort of « psychological » switching costs that increase qop (22).
Finally, it might happen that, with a low level of interoperability for both
technologies, no diffusion actually takes place (figure 6(c)). Nevertheless, in
this case the more likely outcome is that the technology characterised by even
a small advantage locks the market in.
FIGURE 5: Fixed points
(a) Stable node (b) Saddle point
(21) It is worth noting that the probability of such complete displacement is actually reduced
when the decreased interoperability produces an increase of switching costs of OSS users
to PS. Indeed, the increase of qop generated by the decrease of hop actually moves down
the isocline of Ap and a new stable equilibrium with coexistence can arise.
(22) In this sense, for example, the diffusion of the Free Software movement and the creation
of the Free Software Foundation (1984), along with the strong charisma of his founder,
Richard Stallman, have been a great vehicle of diffusion.
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A final remark is on the possibility that, besides the negative externalities
across technologies related to the lack of interoperability analyzed in the
model, there might be positive externalities not only within technologies, but
also across technologies. Indeed, in case of compatible software, the adopters
of one software may enjoy a larger installed base of the other software given
that they can exchange files and information with them (23). Appendix C ana-
lyze a simple extension of the model to account for this possibility and some-
how show that the main results we derived still hold.
FIGURE 6: Comparative dynamics
(a) Decrease of OSS interoperability (hop) (b) Decrease of switching costs for PS users
(qpo)
(c) Strong lack of interoperability
(23) We acknowledge one of the referees for this remark.
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VI. — CONCLUSIONS
This paper has shown how to implement a formal model of innovation dif-
fusion to model two competing technologies in high-tech industries. Indeed, as
they are characterised by the presence of economies of scale, within – and
across-technologies network effects and switching costs, a proper theoretical
modelling is needed, that, to our knowledge, has not been carried out so far.
Moreover, when open-source is considered, other issues arise, such as the
effort of the community and developers’ motivations.
All these topics have been incorporated in a modified version of a standard
epidemic model, which innovates the existing literature in some respects.
Above all, the endogenisation of the propagation coefficient adds substantial
realism to the general structure of the model, yielding interesting results, such
as the coexistence of an asymptotically stable equilibrium where both techno-
logies survive with winner-take-all solutions. This result is obtained in a dyna-
mic setting, thus enriching the achievements of the literature on OSS-PS com-
petition, limited to a static context. Moreover, our model adds up new insights
to the literature on the diffusion of competing technologies under increasing
returns where the standard result is that the market tips in favour of one of the
two. Indeed, the process of competition between technologies has been model-
led by the literature as a situation where either one technology tips the market
for an indefinite period of time (David, 1985 ; Arthur, 1989 ; Amable, 1992) or
a superior technology, after being adopted by a critical mass of users, displaces
the other one (Witt, 1997 ; Andreozzi, 2004). On the contrary, we show how
both coexistence and market tipping are likely outcomes also in a situation
where both technologies start the competition process at the same time.
Finally, network effects and switching costs turn out to be important factors
that the supplier of one technology can change in order to alter the equilibrium
point and thus its market share.
Within this innovative theoretical framework, the main results are the follo-
wing. First of all, in all the different specifications of the model there is always
the possibility to obtain an asymptotically stable equilibrium where both tech-
nologies coexist. Thus, contrary to the result obtained by Amable (1992), the
process of competition between two technologies characterised by increasing
returns do not necessarily ends up with one of the two tipping the market, at
least in the present case, where the possibility of joint adoption is taken into
account.
Second, we have been able to present the conditions that determine the suc-
cess of one technology with respect to another one : (i) under the assumption
of a constant propagation coefficient, the probability of adoption corrected for
the interoperability degree must be greater than the odds against the adoption
of the technology by the current users of the other technology ; (ii) when the
coefficient of propagation is let to vary, then the condition can be computed
formally only if a functional form for the propagation coefficient is assumed.
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Third, in the case of coexistence of both technologies, it is possible to modi-
fy the equilibrium by changing the values of the parameters q and h. In parti-
cular, a decrease of the switching costs for PS users (qpo) yields a more than
proportional increase in the number of OSS users and a simultaneous decrea-
se in the absolute number of PS users. If the interoperability of OSS (hop)
decreases, thus increasing the negative network effects produced by the mass
of PS users, then the number of OSS users decreases and that of PS users
increase. However, such effect can be counterbalanced by the opposite effect
created by the consequential increase of the costs of switching for OSS users
(qop) (24).
Finally, the stability of the equilibrium point is a recursive result through the
different specifications of the model. However, while under the assumption of
exogenous probability of adoption, the equilibrium point is globally stable,
when the propagation coefficient is endogenous the equilibrium point is only
locally stable and it coexists with two other points around which one of the two
technologies is likely to tip the market. In this last case, a change in the para-
meters q and h leads to a modification of the basin of attraction of the equili-
brium point.
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APPENDIX
A. — PROOF OF THE ASYMPTOTIC STABILITY
OF THE EQUILIBRIUM
A.1. Perfect interoperability
In order to prove the stability of the equilibrium in the case of perfect inter-
operability analysed in Section 5.1., let us work out the Jacobian of the system
at the equilibrium:
– bp (A
*
p) A
*
p – qopbp (A
*
p) A
*
p
J = [ ]– qpobo (A*o) A*o – bo (A*o) A*o
The discriminant of the associated characteristic equation is :
D = (– b*pA
*
p – b
*
oA
*
o)
2 – 4 (1 – qpoqop) b
*
pA
*
pb
*
oA
*
o =
= (b*pA
*
p – b
*
oA
*
o)
2 – 4 qpoqopb
*
pA
*
pb
*
oA
*
o > 0
The determinant of J is positive whereas its trace is negative, therefore both
the eigen values are real and negative and (A*p, A
*
o) is a stable node.
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A.2. Non-perfect interoperability
In the more general case of non-perfect interoperability (Section 5.2.), the
Jacobian calculated at the fixed points is :
– bp (A
*
p) A
*
p – ( 1—hpo + bp (A*p)) qopA*p
J = [ ]– ( 1—hpo + bo (A*o)) qpoA*o – bo (A*o) A*o)
The discriminant of the associated characteristic equation is thus :
1                1
D = (b*pA
*
p + b
*
oA
*
o)
2 – 4 (b*pA*pb*oA*o – (—— + b*p) (—— + b*o) qpoqopA*pA*o) =hpo hop
1                1
= (b*pA
*
p – b
*
oA
*
o)
2 + 4 (—— + b*p) (—— + b*o) qpoqopA*pA*o (> 0)hpo hop
This discriminant is always positive, whereas the trace of the Jacobian is nega-
tive. Thus, the fixed points can be either saddle points or stable nodes depen-
ding on the determinant of the Jacobian being positive or negative. This deter-
minant is equal to :
1                1
|J| = b*pA
*
pb
*
oA
*
o – (—— + b*p) (—— + b*o) qpoqopA*pA*ohpo hop
and it is positive if and only if :
1             1             1           1
qpoqop (1 + ——— + ——— + ———  ———) < 1hpob*p hopb*o          hpob*p       hopb*o
that is, if :
hpob
*
p 1
– ———————— < – qpo (1 + ———) (17)
qop (1 + hpob
*
p)             hopb
*
o
Inequality (17) is satisfied in point E of figure 5(a). Indeed, in such point we
have :
dA*o 1
—— < ——
dAp dA
*
p
——
dAo
Given that, from equation (14) it follows that :
dA*o hpob
*
p
—— > – ———————
dAp qop (1 + hpob
*
p)
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Recalling the symmetry between equation (12) and (13), we have :
hpob
*
p dA
*
o 1                           1
– ——————— < —— < —— < – qpo (1 + ———)
qop (1 + hpob
*
p)  dAp dA
*
p hopb
*
o
——
dAo
and the point E is therefore a stable node.
B. — EFFECTS OF PARAMETER CHANGES ON THE ISOCLINE
As for qop, by the envelope theorem the marginal effect of an increase of it
on the maximum of A*o (Ap) – i.e. A
*
oM – is :
∂A*oM A
*
oM
——— = – ——— (< 0)
∂qop qop
This marginal effect is therefore directly proportional to the initial level of
∂2 A*oMthe maximum and it decreases for increasing values of the parameter (———
∂q 2op
> 0).
As for hpo, its marginal effect is :
∂A*oM A
*
oM
——— = ——————————— (> 0)
∂hpo hpo + h
2
pobp (A*o
–1
(A*oM))
Also this effect is directly proportional to the initial level of the maximum
∂2 A*oMand it decreases for increasing values of the parameter (——— < 0).
∂h2po
Moreover, a change of hpo makes also the value of Ap corresponding to A
*
oM
change. In particular, an increase of hpo makes A
*
o
–1
(A*oM) decrease.
Indeed, from equation (14) it follows that the FOC are satisfied if the expres-
sion in brackets is equal to zero. Working out the total differential of such
expression and equating it to zero, after some algebraic manipulation we
obtain :
dAp bp (Ap)
2
—— = – —————————————————————————
b¢p (Ap)
dhpo b¢p (Ap) (1 + hpobp (Ap) + (D – Ap) ———) – (D – Ap) b″p (Ap)
bp (Ap)
and this expression is always negative.
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C. — STABLE AND UNSTABLE EQUILIBRIA WITH POSITIVE
NETWORK EFFECTS ACROSS-TECHNOLOGIES
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume a constant propagation coefficient
for both PS and OSS and suppose that the increase in the installed base of each
software increases the utility of both software for non adopters, so that, besides
increasing the probability that each non user will adopt PS, an increase of PS
users increases the likelihood that a non user will adopt OSS.
Equations 6 can be modified as follows :
qopA˙p = bpAp (D – Ap – qopAo) – —— AoAp + gpAo max (D – Ap – Ao, 0)
hpo
qpoA˙o = boAo (D – Ao – qpoAp) – —— ApAo + goAp max (D – Ap – Ao, 0)
hop
where gp (< bp) and go (< bo) are non negative parameters measuring the extent
of the across-technology positive externalities for PS and OSS respective-
ly (25).
Given the symmetric formulation, we can analyze the isocline of one tech-
nology only. Let us take that of Ap. It can be written as :
hpobp
Ao = ——————————— (D – Ap)
qop (1 + hpobp) – hpogp
M
—
Ap
where M = max (D – Ap – Ao, 0).
It is important to note that this equation is equal to equation 7, but for the
correction term hpogpM/Ap. However, this term is null when D ≤ Ap + Ao.
Therefore, when conditions 17 hold, both the isoclines rest above the line DD,
the correction term does not apply, and the stable equilibrium is the same
found in Section 4 (figure 7(a), see next page). This is because the positive
externalities increase the speed of diffusion for both technologies until all the
users use at least one software, but the market shares in this case are decided
on the co-users.
The case showed in figure 7(b), see next page, is more complex but also in
this case the presence of positive externalities across-technologies does not
alter the main findings. Indeed, the result is the same of figure 1(b). In this case
however, the isoclines are different. In fact, with reasonable values of the para-
(25) These parameters can also be taken as increasing functions of the levels of interoperabili-
ty. So, for instance : gp = gp (hpo), with g¢p (hpo) > 0.
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meters and provided that b > g, the isoclines are convex curves lying between
the DD line and the isoclines for the case of no across-technology externalities
(figure 1(b)). They intersect in the convex hull but the equilibrium is unstable
and at the end one of the two software completely displaces the other (26).
FIGURE 7: Dynamics with constant propagation coefficients
and across-technology positive externalities
(a) Asymptotically stable equilibrium with
technologies’ coexistence (high interoperabi-
lity/low switching costs for both)
(b) Saddle point (low interoperability/high
switching costs for both)
(26) Proofs and examples not included for space constraints and available from the authors at
request.
